Why May can't have it all: the ECJ and the Brexit rules of (dis-)engagement by Tsiftsoglou, Anna
Why	May	can’t	have	it	all:	the	ECJ	and	the	Brexit
rules	of	(dis-)engagement
Theresa	May	was	adamant	that	the	UK	would	not	accept	the	jurisdiction	of	the	European	Court
of	Justice	after	Brexit.	But	as	reality	has	sunk	in,	that	red	line	has	begun	to	blur.	LSE
Fellow	Anna	Tsiftsoglou	explains	why	the	ECJ	is	such	a	vital	issue	in	the	exit	negotiations.	To
reverse	David	Davis’	footballing	metaphor,	if	the	UK	plays	in	EU	territory,	it	has	to	accept	EU
rules	and	referees.
At	the	2016	Conservative	Party	Conference,	Theresa	May	emphatically	declared	to	her	party
that	‘’we	are	not	leaving	(the	EU)	only	to	return	to	the	jurisdiction	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	That	is	not
going	to	happen.”	Fast	forward	nine	months:	in	July	2017,	Mrs.	May,	deeply	wounded	at	the	recent	snap	election,
and	already	three	months	after	triggering	the	famous	Article	50	of	the	Treaty	on	the	EU	–	aka	the	Brexit
procedure	–	has	eventually	conceded	a	transitory	role	for	the	highest	court	of	the	EU.
What	does	that	mean,	and	what	could	explain	this	policy	shift	by	the	British	government?
The	European	Court	of	Justice	(‘the	ECJ’)	is	the	highest	court	of	the	EU,	with	jurisdiction	over	the	whole	spectrum
of	EU	legislation,	primary	and	secondary.	It	is	tasked	to	ensure	the	uniform	application	and	interpretation	of	EU
law.	Ever	since	its	establishment	in	the	1950s,	the	ECJ	is	considered	the	ultimate	arbiter	of	all	matters	related	to
the	EU	Single	Market.
Refereeing	during	a	match	between	KAA	Gent	and	RSC	Anderlecht	in	Gent,	Belgium,	2014.
Photo:	Royal	Sporting	Club	Anderlecht	via	a	CC-BY-NC-SA	2.0	licence
In	the	course	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	–	set	to	last	at	least	until	March	2019	–	and	thereafter,	a	significant	load	of
EU	case	law	on	matters	ranging	from	EU	citizens’	rights	in	the	UK	to	trade	and	immigration	controls	will
probably	arise	or	is	currently	pending	at	the	Luxembourg	court.	Denying	the	ECJ’s	jurisdiction	on	the	disputes
altogether	and	having	them	settled	by	British	courts	applying	national	law	transposing	EU	law	has	complicated
negotiations	even	further.
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The	UK	government,	while	insisting	on	its	hard	Brexit	lines,	has	gradually	tried	to	soften	them.	In	the	recently
published	66-page	Repeal	Bill,	Brexit	Secretary	David	Davis	has	revealed	the	Government’s	statutory	plan	for	the
post-Brexit	era.	Essentially,	the	draft	Bill	repeals	the	1972	European	Communities	Act	with	which	Britain	entered
the	EC	and	which	established	the	supremacy	of	EU	law	over	national	law.	To	avoid	any	legal	black	holes,	on	exit
day	all	the	body	of	existing	EU	law	and	ECJ	case	law	–a	40-year	acquis–	will	be	converted	into	domestic	law,
which	UK	legislators	will	be	free	to	amend	as	they	see	fit.	The	British	government	might	even	use	Henry	the	VIII
powers	to	amend	it	without	any	parliamentary	approval.	As	expected,	the	Repeal	Bill	has	already	and	will
probably	again	provoke	a	‘hell’	when	debated	in	parliament	next	autumn.
Much	as	the	Repeal	Bill	ends	the	ECJ’s	jurisdiction	in	the	post-Brexit	era,	a	fresh	position	paper	shows	the
government’s	willingness	to	negotiate	the	future	of	pending	ECJ	cases	so	as	to	provide	‘certainty’	to	citizens	and
investors	alike	and	ensure	a	smooth	transition.	Nevertheless,	not	all	cabinet	members	have	backed	this	position,
a	sign	of	the	deep	ideological	chasms	that	exist	both	within	UK-EU	relations	and	the	government	itself.
Theresa	May	had	misguidedly	assumed	that	‘taking	back	control’	of	the	country	would	mean	denying	any	role	for
the	EU’s	highest	tribunal	in	the	new	era.	Such	a	red	line	would	harm	rather	than	benefit	the	country,	while	it
remains	a	sticking	point	on	the	ongoing	negotiations.		Rather	naively,	this	red	line	blatantly	assumed	that,	in	the
course	of	Brexit	negotiations,	it	would	be	the	UK,	not	the	EU,	setting	not	only	the	rules	but	even	being	the
referees	of	the	game.	In	Brexit	law	and	in	reality,	it	is	actually	the	other	way	around.	It	is	the	UK	that	is	leaving,
not	the	European	Union	dissolving	its	legal	establishment	or	its	institutions.
Ironically	enough,	the	ECJ	issue	is	yet	another	piece	of	the	ongoing	Brexit	drama	that	started	out	a	year	ago	in
the	aftermath	of	the	2016	referendum.	Theresa	May	had	initially	believed	she	could	go	on	with	her	hard	Brexit
plan	defying	any	rules,	including	constitutional	ones.	However,	as	the	majority	of	the	UK	Supreme	Court
confirmed	in	its	seminal	2017	Miller	case,	the	British	government	could	not	leave	the	EU	without	Parliament’s
consent.	Constitutional	change	for	Britain,	such	as	that	brought	about	when	the	country	entered	the	European
Community	in	the	1970s,	could	only	happen	by	law,	and	not	by	ministers	alone.	Unsurprisingly,	the	Miller	case
has	restated	the	obvious	–	the	respect	of	the	constitution,	and	the	rule	of	law.
As	the	UK	enters	more	rounds	of	negotiations	with	the	EU,	Mrs	May’s	numerous	red	lines	have	started	to	blur.
From	freedom	of	movement	concessions	to	transitional	plans	for	pending	ECJ	case-law,	the	UK	government	is
now	heading	towards	not	a	hard	but	a	pragmatic	Brexit.	Achieving	a	pragmatic	Brexit	would	involve,	inter	alia,
acknowledging	a	transitional	role	of	the	EU’s	ultimate	arbiter	in	the	post-Brexit	era	–	that	is,	coming	to	terms	with
what	is	feasible.	Or	simply	following	the	Brexit	rules	of	dis-engagement.	To	reverse	David	Davis’	football
argument,	if	the	UK	plays	in	an	EU	territory,	one	way	or	another,	then	it	should	accept	the	same	rules	and
referees	for	its	disputes	as	the	rest	of	the	28	teams	of	the	EU	league.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Anna	Tsiftsoglou	is	the	National	Bank	of	Greece	Fellow	at	the	LSE	Hellenic	Observatory.	Her	research	interests
include	constitutional	law,	human	rights	law	and	EU	law	and	politics.	She	is	currently	working	on	a	monograph	on
constitutional	change	in	crisis-hit	states	from	a	comparative	perspective,	in	the	cases	of	Greece	and	Cyprus.
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